After spending 15 years in charge of seven different teams in Italy, Luciano Spalletti moved to Russia to take over Zenit St Petersburg in 2009, where he won the league title the following year. Yet when he retires he will no doubt be remembered as the manager who played a strikerless system in Serie A, which for a few seasons had AS Roma functioning well above the sum of their individual parts.
Overachievement
During his four years at I Lupi the former midfielder won innumerable plaudits for performing above the expectations of a team that contained only one recognised star: Francesco Totti. An 11-match winning streak in 2005/06 helped him win the Serie A Coach of the Year award, while he also proved time and again his tactical nous was better than that of Internazionale’s Roberto Mancini. Roma triumphed 3-1 at the San Siro in 2007 in a season where they would also win 7-4 on aggregate in the Coppa Italia final against the Nerazzuri. The following season Spalletti added more silverware at the expense of Manicini and Inter, with a 1-0 win in the Italian equivalent of the Community Shield, the Supercoppa Italiana. They defended their Copa Italia in 2008, again beating Inter, this time 2-1 in a single match final.
Roma were a mixed bag in Europe. They recorded two victories over Real Madrid at the Bernabeu, the first European side to do so, but both times went on to lose to Manchester United at the quarter-final stage, the first of which by a humiliating 8-3 aggregate score. However, there was no real disgrace in this as The Red Devils proceeded to win the competition on one of these occasions and lose to Milan, the eventual winners, on the other.
System
As mentioned in the introduction, Spalletti often employed a strikerless system during his time at The Stadio Olympico; at least, the team did not contain a traditional centre forward, a ‘number 9’. The formation came about when, deprived of a spearhead in his attack through injury, Spalletti was forced to play Francesco Totti as the furthest man forward.
Or was he? Totti may have gone down on many reporters’ notepads as a striker, but he played in pretty much the sametrequartista role as usual. As Zonal Marking notes, 4-6-0 is an exaggeration, but 4-5-1-0 is still revolutionary. This meant Roma effectively had four players in the centre of the park, which allowed the team to keep hold of possession with ease. The team’s wingers and central midfielders often broke from deep to occupy the space left by Totti.
Yet Totti did not suffer from his withdrawn role, in fact he became more prolific. In the 2006/07 season he notched 26 league goals to win both the Serie A and European Golden Boots.
This season, under the management of first Claudio Ranieri and now caretaker Vincenzo Montella, Roma remain incredibly malleable and their formation is never settled. They can play a conventional, Italian 4-3-1-2 (or 4-3-2-1, depending on personnel and your interpretation). This comprises three combative, primarily defensive midfielders and a front three that incorporates Totti as a trequartista and/or Jeremy Menez as a roaming second striker, or ‘central winger’. The fullbacks and forwards are relied upon for width.
However, in Roma’s 2-0 derby victory over Lazio they reverted to their strikerless line-up, and it has been said that Montella is a big fan of this formation. Mirko Vicinic and Menez played wide left and right respectively and Simone Perrotta supported Totti, who seemingly lead the attack but, as usual, drifted towards a deeper role. Regardless of formation, Totti is always the main man, Roma’s talisman. He scored a brace against Lazio that typically comprised a free kick and a penalty.
A new fashion
As we saw back in 1966 with England’s Word Cup-winning ‘wingless wonders’, tactical innovation can lead to future trends. Sir Alf Ramsey’s team were set up in what would now be called a midfield diamond, leaving opposition full backs looking at each other in bewilderment at who they should be marking.
Similarly, Spalletti’s legacy lives on; it was immediately adopted by Sir Alex Ferguson. His United team contained Wayne Rooney, Cristiano Ronaldo, Carlos Tevez and Ryan Giggs/Park Ji-Sung/Nani playing in a fluid front line with no discernable focal point. Their pace and movement negated the need for a traditional English target man, and this combination and strategy led to some of the most breathtaking football any of Ferguson’s team have played (it could even be argued this style stems from Dutch total football). Many believe this team bettered the treble-winning class of ’99, and while it’s hard to call it ‘strikerless’, one must concur it was often hard to tell who was playing where when Rooney, Ronaldo and Tevez could all do the same jobs. In fact some called these three the new ‘holy trinity’, a phrase first used to describe United legends George Best, Bobby Charlton and Dennis Law.
This season has seen the re-emergence of the strikerless team, most notably in Spain. Last year Zlatan Ibrahimovic played as a conventional centre forward at Camp Nou, but since his loan move to Milan, Barcelona now employ a 4-3-3 that, with Dani Alves’ incredibly attacking play from right back, has sometimes been called a 3-4-3 or 3-5-2. Despite the Brazilian’s forays it most resembles a 4-3-1-2 with wing forwards. Lionel Messi plays as a withdrawn striker which sees him involved in more of the build-up play than previously (yes, this is possible). This leaves David Villa (a striker) and Pedro (a winger) playing left and right of the hole where Messi ‘should’ be. From here they can play wide or make Freddie Ljungberg-like diagonal runs into the middle and behind the defence.
Previous Barca manager Frank Rijkaard had tried this idea a couple of times in Europe against English sides, deploying Ronaldinho in the centre forward slot and Samuel Eto’o wide right. However, in all probability this was an attempt to confuse defenders and he usually reverted the players to their normal places during the game. See more on Barcelona’s current formation at A Tactical View.
False nine
Other teams play with a withdrawn forward and the phrase ‘false nine’ is now well and truly lodged in our tactical vocabulary. Manchester City’s Carlos Tevez is a classic example of a striker who likes to do the majority of his work in midfield, but as with all good players who do this job, he also knows when to get in the box and score goals. Note how playing this way does not usually result in a lower goal return – Messi, Totti and Tevez simply become more effective overall while still finding the net regularly. But this could just be a case of them being fantastic individuals; it’s hard to imagine lesser players still being able to score like a centre forward from this position.
So, was Spalletti’s Roma experiment truly ground-breaking and has it had a lasting impact? The existence of the ‘second striker’ is not a new phenomenon by any means. In the old five man attacks of the 1950s teams would play with two wingers, a centre forward and two inside forwards – deep lying supporting attackers who would probably be classified nowadays as ‘in the hole’ attacking midfielders like Paul Gascoigne and Ronaldinho. More recently, classic strike partnerships have often consisted of a number nine/number 10 double act, for example Jimmy Floyd Hasselbaink and Gianfranco Zola at Chelsea or Thierry Henry and Dennis Bergkamp at Arsenal.
What Spalletti’s team showed was that it was possible to play a second striker, the Zola or Bergkamp, without the first striker’s presence. The withdrawn forward plays as a bogus target man who drops deep instead of leading the line (hence the name, ‘false nine’). On paper he will appear to be the point of the attack, while in practice he will instead often be the instigator.
However, this tactic can only be effective with the right players. Tactically astute midfielders are required who know when and where to break forward. At Roma these take the shape of Perrotta and David Pizarro, while Barcelona’s Xavi Hernandez and Andres Iniesta are two of the most intelligent, strategically minded midfielders in modern football, who also have the benefit of having played together for 15 years.
Conclusion
Returning to the crux of this piece, Roma’s 2007 team came fifth in Zonal Marking’s Teams of the Decade series. Whether the 4-6-0 system was intentional, or as Michael Cox thinks an Alexander Flemming-esque accidental discovery, it’s hard to say. But it was often very effective, as Spalletti’s domination over Mancini in head-to-head matches shows. It’s perhaps more of a style than a formation and will only be seen at the very top end of football, instead of filtering down through the leagues like 4-2-3-1 will inevitably do.
Jude Ellery , Football Farrago
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